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ursuing wildlife resources through hunting and fishing has always 
been vitally important to many Native American tribes. Many 
tribes still depend on hunting and fishing as a source of food, income, 
and employment. Yet, for many tribal members hunting and fishing 
represents not only a livelihood, but a way of life. Often, these 
practices are fundamental to maintaining a tribe’s culture, traditions, 
and sense of community. Even the Supreme Court recognized that 
access to wildlife was “not much less necessary to the existence of the 
Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.”1 
As a result of numerous treaties and statutes, Native Americans 
enjoy a federally protected right to hunt and fish.2 Native American 
hunting and fishing rights are often more expansive than the rights of 
non-tribal members. Consequently, “[m]any non-Indians deeply 
resent Indian hunting and fishing rights, and few other areas of Indian 
law have created such bitter—and sometimes violent—”disputes.3 
However, tribes have every right to assert their federally protected 
	  
1 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 186 (4th ed. 2012). 
P 
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hunting and fishing rights, as they often surrendered extensive 
landholdings to the government in return for such treaty guarantees.4 
This Comment explores the origin, nature, and protection of Native 
American hunting and fishing rights in the United States. Part I 
explores Native Americans’ unique relationship with wildlife 
resources through hunting and fishing. Pertinent background 
information on the origins of Native American hunting and fishing 
rights is offered in Part II. Part III provides a critique of the legal 
protection for tribal hunting and fishing rights—focusing on 
inconsistencies in treaty abrogation cases—which is followed by the 
assertion that Native American hunting and fishing rights are 
intangible cultural heritage in Part IV. Finally, Parts V and VI 
examine the international protections for intangible cultural heritage, 
their force in the United States, and how they could be employed to 
better protect Native American hunting and fishing as intangible 
cultural heritage. 
Current law and policy in the United States has failed to develop a 
framework that accounts for the unique nature of intangible cultural 
heritage. Therefore, intangible cultural heritage, such as Native 
American hunting and fishing rights, lacks adequate protection. 
However, international laws—such as the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,5 and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage6—
can help United States lawmakers develop a framework that 
recognizes Native American hunting and fishing rights as intangible 
cultural heritage, and adequately protects them as such. 
	  
4 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
5 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. 
Declaration], available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 
6 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage art. 1, 
Oct. 17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 35 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention], available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf. 
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I 
HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATIVE 
AMERICAN CULTURE 
A. The Native American Worldview and the Importance of Hunting 
and Fishing as a Spiritual Practice 
The importance of hunting and fishing to Native American culture 
cannot be overestimated.7 To fully understand the importance of these 
rights, it is essential to first understand the Native American 
worldview.8 Native Americans believe that they are part of the earth, 
and that the earth is part of them.9 They believe the flora and fauna of 
the earth are their relatives,10 and that all human and nonhuman 
objects possess a soul.11 Accordingly, Native Americans view the 
world as a society, rather than a mechanism, that is made up of 
beings, rather than objects.12 “Whether human or nonhuman, these 
beings are associated with and related to one another socially . . . in 
the same ways as human beings to one another. These patterns of 
association and relationship may be structured in terms of kinship, 
empathy, sympathy, reciprocity, sexuality, dependency” or any other 
ways humans interact with each other.13 “Plants, animals, rocks, and 
stars are thus seen not as ‘objects’ governed by laws of nature, but as 	  
7 SANDRA L. OLSEN, Animals in American Indian Life: An Overview, in STARS ABOVE 
EARTH BELOW: AMERICAN INDIANS AND NATURE 95, 95 (Marsha C. Bol ed., 1998). 
8 CALVIN MARTIN, KEEPERS OF THE GAME: INDIAN-ANIMAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE 
FUR TRADE 33 (1978). Scholars and intergovernmental organizations, like the United 
Nations, have recognized that the special relationship among Native Americans, the earth, 
and its flora and fauna appears to be universal. See Gary D. Meyers, Different Sides of the 
Same Coin: A Comparative View of Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights in the United 
States and Canada, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 67, 79 (1991) (citing Darlene M. 
Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of Group Self Preservation, 2 
CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 19, 32 (1989) (noting that a comprehensive study of 
indigenous peoples by a special U.N. Commission concluded that: “It is essential to know 
and understand the deeply spiritual and special relationship between indigenous peoples 
and their land as basic to their existence as such and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions 
and culture”)). 
9 Meyers, supra note 8, at 80 (citing Annie L. Booth & Harvey M. Jacobs, Ties That 
Bind: Native American Beliefs as a Foundation for Environmental Consciousness, 12 
ENVTL. ETHICS 27, 34 (1990). 
10 Id. at 80–81. 
11 Id. at 80 (quoting Scott Hardt, The Sacred Public Lands: Improper Line Drawing in 
the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Analysis, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 601, 605 (1989)). 
12 MARTIN, supra note 8, at 33 (quoting Murray Wax, Religion and Magic, in 
INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 225, 235) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
13 Id. at 34. 
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‘fellows’ with whom the individual or band may have a more or less 
advantageous relationship.”14 
Native American hunting and fishing practices are inextricably 
intertwined within this complex spiritual framework.15 Native 
Americans preserve their relationship with the prey species16 by 
developing and observing specific rituals and taboos.17 These rituals 
and taboos were designed to communicate reverence for their prey 
and to ensure successful capture of the prey species in the future.18 If 
the relationship between the prey species and the Native Americans 
remained favorable by adherence to the rituals and taboos, the prey 
would cooperate and willingly submit itself to be taken by Native 
Americans.19 
There are many examples of hunting and fishing rituals and taboos 
in Native American culture. The Zuni and Hopi tribes painted deer 
bones with red ochre and placed the bones in a pile as a small shrine 
“so that the deer would continue to let the tribe hunt them.”20 The 
Pueblo had a specific song to accompany each step of a deer hunt.21 
There were separate songs to locate the deer trail, to track the deer, to 
establish first contact with the slain deer, to skin the deer, to butcher 
the deer, and to carry the meat home.22 Before the Micmac kill a 
hibernating bear, they make a conciliatory speech to the animal.23 
After the bear is killed, the hunter sincerely apologizes to the bear for 
taking its life.24 After the hunt, the Micmac treat the bear’s body with 
extreme reverence.25 The parts of the bear that are not used are 
ceremonially disposed of, and the bear meat is consumed while 
	  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 35. 
16 This term is used to describe the species for which Native Americans hunt or fish. 
17 MARTIN, supra note 8, at 35; Shelley D. Turner, The Native American’s Right to 
Hunt and Fish: An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System, the 
Effect of European Contact and the Continuing Fight to Observe a Way of Life, 19 N.M. 
L. REV. 377, 382–83 (1989). 
18 OLSEN, supra note 7, at 97. 
19 See MARTIN, supra note 8, at 35–36; OLSEN, supra note 7, at 97; Turner, supra note 
17, at 379–83. 
20 OLSEN, supra note 7, at 113. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 112; MARTIN, supra note 8, at 36. 
24 MARTIN, supra note 8, at 36. 
25 OLSEN, supra note 7, at 112. 
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adhering to specific rituals.26 Many Native American tribes on the 
Pacific coast still practice the First Salmon Ceremony.27 During this 
ceremony, Native Americans eat the first spring-run salmon, which is 
caught, carried, and cooked in a traditional manner.28 After the 
salmon is eaten, the tribe returns the bones, and sometimes the blood, 
of the salmon to the river.29 
Native Americans believe that failure to observe the rituals and 
taboos may offend the prey, which would strain the tribe’s 
relationship with the entire prey species.30 Tribes thought the 
offended prey could retaliate in a variety of ways.31 For example, 
once the tribe ate the offended prey, the prey could make them sick.32 
It could also communicate the tribe’s offense to its living companions 
and encourage them to either abandon the Native Americans’ 
territories, or refuse to allow themselves to be taken by the tribe.33 
B. The Evolution of Native American Hunting and Fishing Practices 
In addition to being inextricably linked to the spiritual practices 
and beliefs of Native Americans,34 hunting and fishing traditionally 
played a fundamental role in Native American daily life.35 Many 
tribes depended on hunting and fishing as a primary food source.36 
Hunting and fishing also provided Native Americans with the raw 
materials for functional objects like tools, weapons, clothing, and 
shelter.37 
	  
26 MARTIN, supra note 8, at 36. 
27 Katrine Barber, The Cultural Context of Native Fisheries, THE OR. HIST. SOC’Y 
(2006), http://www.ohs.org/education/oregonhistory/narratives/subtopic.cfm?subtopic_ID 
=598; DENNIS M. GAWLIK, PUGET SOUND WILD SALMON FISHERIES: THE POSSIBLE 
APPLICATION OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) 14 (2010), available at 
http://www.evergreen.edu/tribal/docs/Gawlik%20Puget%20Sound%20Salmon%20Fisher 
ies%2012%204%2010.pdf. 
28 GAWLIK, supra note 27; Barber, supra note 27. 
29 Barber, supra note 27. 
30 See MARTIN, supra note 8, at 39. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 MARTIN, supra note 8, at 33–39; OLSEN, supra note 7, at 96–97; Turner, supra note 
17, at 379–83. 
35 OLSEN, supra note 7, at 95–97; see also Turner, supra note 17, at 382. 
36 See OLSEN, supra note 7, at 95, 112, 114; Turner, supra note 17, at 382. 
37 See OLSEN, supra note 7, at 95; Turner, supra note 17, at 382. 
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For instance, Native Americans used animal hides to fashion 
clothing, footwear, tents, bedding, bags, and blankets.38 They used 
animal tendons to make sinew thread, which was used for sewing 
animal hides, making bows, and securing arrow points.39 Native 
Americans even used hooves and horns to make useful items, such as 
rattles and glue.40 They also used animal bones to make awls, 
needles, rings, and hide scrapers.41 Furthermore, nomadic tribes such 
as the Blackfeet, Flathead, Comanche, Gros Ventre, Kiowa, and Sarsi 
tribes migrated with the buffalo throughout the year.42 
In addition, hunting and fishing was also linked to social hierarchy 
and status within some tribes. For instance, the Lubicon Cree elders 
and senior men drew their status from their expertise as hunters, while 
the women acquired status from their ability to prepare food and use 
hides from the hunt, and their capacity to tan furs and preserve food.43 
Hunting was also linked to Native American rites of passage into 
adulthood. For example, Kickapoo boys were considered adults after 
they killed their first game, and Micmac boys became adults after 
killing their first large game.44 Maliseet-Passamaquoddy boys were 
allowed to sit at council with the older men and participate in public 
feasts after killing their first moose.45 
Colonialism changed the Native Americans’ relationship with 
nature by introducing diseases, Christian missionaries, and the fur 
trade.46 Early European travelers introduced a host of alien diseases to 
the Native American populations, such as smallpox and influenza.47 
Native Americans were especially susceptible to these diseases 
because they had not developed adequate immune responses to them 
	  
38 OLSEN, supra note 7, at 95–96, 113. 
39 Id. at 95. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 113. 
42 Id. at 114. 
43 Andrew Huff, Resource Development and Human Rights: A Look at the Case of the 
Lubicon Cree Indian Nation of Canada, 10 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 161, 169–
70 (1999). 
44 CAROL A. MARKSTROM, EMPOWERMENT OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN GIRLS: 
RITUAL EXPRESSIONS AT PUBERTY 162 (2008) (citing BARRY M. PRITZKER, NATIVE 
AMERICANS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, CULTURE, AND PEOPLES vols. 1–2 (1998)). 
45 Id. (citing Vincent O. Erickson, Maliseet-Passamaquoddy, in 15 NORTHEAST 123, 
130–31 (Bruce G. Trigger & William C. Sturtevant eds., 1978)). 
46 Turner, supra note 17, at 384. 
47 Id. at 384, 386. 
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as the Europeans had.48 Some studies suggest that these diseases 
killed ninety to ninety-five percent of the Native American population 
in the first two hundred years after European contact.49 
Native Americans’ “reaction to disease is an important 
consideration in the study of aboriginal hunting and fishing and its 
interrelationship with the spiritual and religious structure of the native 
North American Indians.”50 Native Americans did not initially trace 
the emergence of disease to the arrival of the Europeans.51 Instead, 
Native Americans believed that the rituals and taboos that they relied 
upon to maintain their relationship with nature had become 
ineffective.52 Therefore, Native Americans, “who had always blamed 
offended wildlife for their sicknesses, now suspected that the 
contagion was the result of a conspiracy of the beasts.”53 
In an attempt to extricate themselves from the morbid grip of the 
conspiracy of the beasts, the Indians sought to destroy their wildlife 
tormentors by engaging in a war of revenge. The war of revenge 
soon gained momentum under the influence of the [Christian] 
missionaries who sought to change the spiritual edifice of the native 
Indians, as well as by the incentives and luxuries afforded by 
participation in the historic fur trade.54 
However, Native Americans developed new hunting and fishing 
rituals throughout the colonial period, which suggests that their 
spiritual framework remained intact.55 For example, the Micmac tribe 
removed the eyes of fish and other prey after they were killed.56 This 
act was thought to blind the prey, so it could not observe the 
irreverent treatment of its carcass.57 If the prey’s eyes were left intact 
the prey would be offended and retaliate, which would frustrate future 
hunting or fishing of the prey species.58 This practice has been 
interpreted as a way for Native Americans to “hide [their] guilt” for 
	  
48 Id. at 386. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 387. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See id. at 391 n.79. 
56 See id. at 391. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
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discontinuing certain hunting and fishing rituals and taboos, while 
also ensuring successful hunting in the future.59 
C. The Cultural Importance of Hunting and Fishing to Current Native 
American Tribes 
Although the lives of Native Americans today are substantially 
different than the lives of precolonial and colonial Native Americans, 
hunting and fishing remain a fundamental link to tradition, cultural 
identity, spirituality, and subsistence for many modern tribes.60 Two 
examples of the current importance of hunting and fishing are Inupiat 
whale hunts and the Puget Sound tribes’ salmon fishing. The Inupiat 
characterize the bowhead whale hunt as one of the most culturally 
significant activities in Eskimo life, which forms a “cornerstone” of 
Inupiat society.61 Elaborate ceremonies and rituals accompany the 
beginning of the whale hunt and the killing and consuming of the 
whale.62 Engaging in the whale hunt strengthens “kinship bonds and 
community ties.”63 Traditional sharing of the whale meat is a primary 
way for the Inupiat to “create a sense of social cohesion.”64 Similarly, 
salmon fishing is essential to the culture of many Puget Sound 
tribes.65 For many tribal members, fishing is a way of life—not just a 
livelihood.66 Members of the tribal community are brought together 
through traditional subsistence fishing, which strengthens the bond 
between the tribal community and its members.67 In an interview with 
thirteen Puget Sound tribes, individual tribal members described the 
importance of salmon fishing to their tribal religion, culture, physical 
sustenance, and community well-being.68 One tribal member stated, 
“[s]almon’s role in ceremonial life for the tribe is unsurpassed and 	  
59 Id. 
60 Jennifer Sepez, Treaty Rights and the Right to Culture: Native American Subsistence 
Issues in U.S. Law, 14 CULTURAL DYNAMICS 144 (2002). 
61 Elizabeth M. Bakalar, Subsistence Whaling in the Native Village of Barrow: 
Bringing Autonomy to Native Alaskans Outside the International Whaling Commission, 30 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 601, 601–02 (2005). 
62 Id. at 609. 
63 Id. at 602 (citing MILTON M.R. FREEMAN ET AL., INUIT, WHALING AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 31–32 (1998)). 
64 Id. 
65 GAWLIK, supra note 27, at 5. 
66 Id. at 23. 
67 Id. at 24. 
68 See id. app. A. 
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traditions surrounding salmon harvests are passed down from 
generation to generation. . . . Younger members of the tribe are taught 
the ways of our ancestors and the importance of salmon to our 
people.”69 Another member declared, “I believe that traditional ways 
of life are critical to our survival. . . . [I]f the salmon die, we die. It is 
that simple.”70 
Therefore, whether Native Americans lived in the Arctic, along the 
shores of the Pacific coast, among the Rocky Mountains, or within the 
vast central prairies, their livelihoods, religion, and culture are 
inextricably tied to fish and wildlife resources. The history of these 
peoples plainly documents that the pursuit of these resources for both 
physical and spiritual sustenance represents a heritage of hunting and 
fishing that is incredibly important to their cultures. The extent to 
which tribes rely on hunting and fishing to uphold their culture varies 
from tribe to tribe. However, hunting and fishing rights remain central 
to many modern tribes’ culture, and are one of the most hotly 
contested areas of legal battle for Native Americans.71 
The reason these rights continue to be so hotly contested is partly 
due to the inconsistent and unpredictable nature of the jurisprudence, 
and partly because these rights are fundamental to many tribes’ 
cultural integrity and survival. A more predictable and consistent 
approach to Native American hunting and fishing rights could better 
protect these fundamental rights and demonstrate respect for the 
cultural heritage of Native Americans. 
II 
LEGAL BASIS FOR NATIVE AMERICANS’ CLAIMS TO HUNTING AND 
FISHING RIGHTS 
Native American hunting and fishing rights derive from original 
occupation of the land, which includes “aboriginal rights” and treaty-
guaranteed rights.72 The U.S. Constitution vests the federal 
government with exclusive power to regulate Native American 
affairs,73 such as hunting and fishing. Specifically, the Commerce 
Clause gives Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with . . . 
	  
69 Id. app. A at 28. 
70 Id. app. A at 32. 
71 Turner, supra note 17, at 377. 
72 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 18.01[1], at 1154–56 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]; Meyers, supra note 8, at 68. 
73 Meyers, supra note 8, at 94. 
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Indian Tribes.”74 Article II assigns the President the power to make 
treaties with Native American tribes,75 and the Supremacy Clause 
establishes that laws passed by Congress “and all Treaties made . . . 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land.”76 In addition, the federal government has a “trust-like” 
relationship with Native American tribes.77 In other words, the 
government has a fiduciary duty to “act in the best interest of the 
various [Native American tribes] . . . and protect both aboriginal and 
treaty-guaranteed rights.”78 Consequently, states cannot legislate or 
regulate in ways that conflict with any federal law about, or treaty-
guarantee related to, Native American hunting and fishing rights.79 
A. Aboriginal Rights 
Native Americans hold aboriginal title to the land and retain certain 
aboriginal rights derived from their original occupation of the land.80 
One such right is the right to hunt and fish.81 In Mitchel v. United 
States,82 the Supreme Court explained the nature of aboriginal rights: 
“Indian possession or occupation was considered with reference to 
their habits and modes of life, their hunting grounds were . . . in their 
actual possession . . . and their rights to its exclusive enjoyment in 
their own way and for their own purposes were as much respected.”83 
Aboriginal title gives Native Americans “the sole right to occupy and 
use their ancestral lands, until that right is surrendered by the tribes or 
extinguished by the dominant sovereign.”84 However, in general, the 	  
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
75 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 
391 U.S. 404, 411 n.12 (1968). 
76 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
77 Meyers, supra note 8, at 93; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 2.01[2], 
at 112 (“The field of Federal Indian law has been concerned centrally with protecting 
Indian tribes from illegitimate assertions of state power over tribal affairs.”). For a more 
detailed discussion of the creation and development of this characterization, see Meyers, 
supra note 8, at 89–93. 
78 Meyers, supra note 8, at 93. 
79 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 2.01[2], at 112; Meyers, supra note 8, at 
115. 
80 Meyers, supra note 8, at 68. 
81 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.01, at 1154. 
82 Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. 711 (1835). 
83 Id. at 746. 
84 Meyers, supra note 8, at 71; see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 543 
(1832) (“It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter 
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government can extinguish aboriginal title at will, and by any means 
available, without compensating the tribes.85 In Tee-Hit-Ton Indians 
v. United States,86 the Supreme Court characterized aboriginal rights 
as “unrecognized” rights, or as permissive occupation of the land.87 
Specifically, it stated that “Indian occupation of land without 
government recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking 
or extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment 
or any other principle of law.”88 If the government extinguishes 
aboriginal title, Native Americans’ right to hunt and fish on those 
lands would also be extinguished, unless preserved by a treaty or 
statute.89 
Although both the federal courts and Native Americans recognize 
the existence of aboriginal rights, they disagree over the source and 
scope of these rights.90 The Supreme Court characterizes aboriginal 
rights simply as property rights that arise from Native American 
occupation of the land.91 Native Americans believe aboriginal rights 
are much more holistic than simple property rights.92 They also view 
aboriginal rights as rights arising out of “natural law.”93 Chippewa 
Chief Fred Plain explains: 	  
of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the 
other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should 
give the discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the preexisting right 
of its ancient possessors. . . . But power, war, conquest, give rights, which, after 
possession, are conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by those on 
whom they descend.”); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 587-88 (1823) (“The 
power now possessed by the government of the United States to grant [Indian] lands, 
resided, while we were colonies, in the crown, or its grantees. The validity of the titles 
given by either has never been questioned in our Courts. . . . The existence of this power 
must negative the existence of any right which may conflict with, and control it. An 
absolute title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in different persons, or in different 
governments.”). 
85 Meyers, supra note 8, at 71; see also Lac Courte Oreilles Band, Etc. v. Voigt, 700 
F.2d 341, 351 (7th Cir. 1983); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278–
79, 285 (1955). But see County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247–48 
(1985) (quoting United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 
339, 346, 354 (1941) (noting that congressional intent to extinguish original title must be 
“plain and unambiguous,” and “cannot be lightly implied”)). 
86 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 272. 
87 Id. at 278–79. 
88 Id. at 285. 
89 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.01, at 1155. 
90 Meyers, supra note 8, at 68. 
91 Id. at 82. 
92 Id. at 83. 
93 Id. at 82. 
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We aboriginal people believe that no individual or group owns the 
land, that the land was given to us collectively by the Creator to use, 
not to own . . . . The idea that land can be bought and sold, or that 
you can exercise some rights but not others in the land, is absolutely 
foreign to the Nishnawbe-Aski way of thinking. Yet this is the basis 
for all legislation that has been enacted since the coming of the 
Europeans to North America.94 
Chief Plain also explains that hunting and fishing rights are aboriginal 
rights: 
[T]he economy of [Native Americans] . . . living in this part of 
North America was based on the presence of animal, fish, bird, and 
plant life destined to give sustenance to the people. Hunting[] [and] 
fishing . . . were not separate issues to be dealt with at a political 
level by certain components of government; they were part of the 
socio-economic system of our people, and they are included in the 
overall definition of aboriginal rights.95 
B. Treaty Rights 
The content and scope of rights protected by treaty are the same as 
those protected by aboriginal rights.96 However, unlike aboriginal 
rights, treaty rights were formally negotiated and committed to 
writing.97 Accordingly, treaty rights enjoy greater legal protection 
than aboriginal rights.98 In fact, treaties between the government and 
a Native American tribe have the same legal force as treaties between 
the government and foreign nations.99 In addition to having more 
legal force, treaty rights differ from aboriginal rights in two other 
ways. First, the government cannot terminate treaty rights at will, as it 
can for rights based on aboriginal title. If the government seeks to 
terminate treaty rights through legislative action, it must have the 
intent to do so.100 Second, when the government abrogates treaty 	  
94 Fred Plain, A Treatise on the Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of the Continent of 
North America, in THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND ABORIGINAL 
RIGHTS 31, 34 (Menno Boldt, J. Anthony Long & Leroy Little Bear eds., 1985). 
95 Id. at 37. 
96 Meyers, supra note 8, at 88. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 94. 
100 Id. at 86; see, e.g., Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973); Menominee Tribe of 
Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412 (1968); United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians 
v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1941). The standard for congressional 
intent to abrogate a tribe’s rights is not well settled. See infra note 122 and accompanying 
text. 
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rights, the tribe that possesses those rights is entitled to compensation, 
because abrogation is considered a taking by the government.101 
Most Native American tribes have some form of treaty or 
agreement with the federal government.102 Many of these treaties 
specifically guarantee the continuance of Native American hunting 
and fishing rights. However, even where the right to hunt and fish is 
not expressly mentioned in the treaty, the Supreme Court has held that 
the treaty still includes the right to hunt and fish.103 In addition, 
hunting and fishing rights are not necessarily limited to lands owned 
by the tribe; these rights can extend to both publicly and privately 
held lands.104 When a treaty grants or reserves land to a tribe, tribal 
ownership of the land automatically includes full hunting and fishing 
rights.105 Many treaties also “reserved” hunting and fishing rights on 
land granted to the government by the tribe.106 Therefore, treaties can 
reserve tribal hunting and fishing rights on land that is not owned by 
the tribe. A tribe’s right to hunt and fish on land not owned by the 
tribe functions like an easement that runs with the land.107 
C. Treaty Interpretation 
The Supreme Court established several canons of construction to 
guide analysis of Native American treaties.108  First, a treaty must be 
understood the way Native Americans would have understood it.109 	  
101 Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. at 413; Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 
U.S. 86, 105 (1949). 
102 Meyers, supra note 8, at 118 (citing CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, 
TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 7-
8 (1987)). 
103 Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. at 406 (noting that lands reserved by the 
tribes, that are “‘to be held as Indian lands are held,’ include the right to fish and to hunt”); 
see also Meyers, supra note 8, at 94. 
104 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.04[1], at 1163-64; Meyers, supra 
note 8, at 94; Turner, supra note 17, at 420. 
105 See, e.g., Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. at 406. 
106 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.02, at 1156–57, 1156 n.5. 
107 Id. at 1157 (citing United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905)). The treaty-
reserved easements are considered property rights within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment, which is why government abrogation of treaty rights requires compensation. 
Id. 
108 See id.; Meyers, supra note 8, at 86; Turner, supra note 17, at 398–99. 
109 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 2.02[1], at 113–14; see, e.g., Minnesota v. 
Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999) (“[W]e interpret Indian 
treaties to give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood 
them.”); Winans, 198 U.S. at 380 (“[W]e have said we will construe a treaty with the 
Indians as [they] understood it . . . .”). 
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Second, any ambiguities in the terms of the treaty must be resolved in 
favor of the Native Americans.110 Lastly, treaties are liberally 
construed in favor of Native Americans.111  Accordingly, to resolve 
ambiguity in the meaning or scope of a treaty, courts may consider 
the treaty’s history and negotiations and the parties’ practical 
understanding of the treaty’s terms.112  
These canons of construction are based on communication 
difficulties between Native American tribes and government 
negotiators, the imbalance of power between the tribes and the 
government, and the fact that tribes were unlikely to have understood 
the legal ramifications of the exact wording of the treaties.113 For 
example, many tribes had strong oral traditions.114 Accordingly, 
tribes often believed that the most important part of the treaty 
agreement was the promises and discussions that took place during 
treaty negotiations.115 However, government negotiators believed the 
written text of the treaty determined its extent and meaning.116 The 
different understandings of property ownership between the Native 
Americans and government negotiators also contributed to confusion 
about treaty terms.117  Native Americans believed they were part of 
the Earth and not separate from it; thus, they could not “own” it.118 
Since government negotiators failed to understand this viewpoint, 
Native Americans were forced to define—in European legal terms—
what was “essentially a country of the mind.”119 In addition, the 
history and circumstances of treaty negotiations, the fact that Native 
American negotiators rarely spoke English, and the fact that 	  
110 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 2.02[1], at 113 (citing Winters v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908)); see, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian 
Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 (1985) (“[It] is well established that treaties should be construed 
liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.”) 
(citations omitted); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (“By a rule of 
interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be 
resolved from the standpoint of the Indians.”). 
111 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 2.02[1], at 113; see, e.g., Oneida Indian 
Nation, 470 U.S. at 247. 
112 Meyers, supra note 8, at 88. 
113 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.02, at 1157; see also Meyers, supra note 
8, at 86–87. 
114 Meyers, supra note 8, at 86. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 75–76. 
119 Id. at 76 (quoting PETER MATTHIESSEN, INDIAN COUNTRY 5 (1984)). 
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government negotiators transcribed the terms of the treaty, further 
justify the canons of construction.120 
III 
INCONSISTENCIES IN ABROGATION CASES DIMINISH NATIVE 
AMERICAN HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS 
Many Native American hunting and fishing claims turn on whether 
an act of Congress abrogates a tribe’s right to hunt or fish.121 The 
Supreme Court has been very clear in its language—to abrogate a 
tribe’s right to hunt and fish, Congress must have the intent to do 
so;122  and “the intent[] to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be 
lightly imputed to the Congress.”123 However, the practice is often 
quite different from the language. “[T]he existence of congressional 
intent may often be somewhat of a fiction, as [courts] ha[ve] often 
found intent when it is arguably non-existent and refused to find 
intent when it seems clear.”124  One scholar suggests that courts’ 
engagement in the “formality” of finding congressional intent 
demonstrates the strong “legitimizing element of congressional intent 
in diminishing Indian rights.”125 In either case, the judiciary has 
failed to develop a coherent framework to determine congressional 
intent.126 As a result, the abrogation case law is inconsistent and 
unpredictable.127 
Courts have developed a multitude of standards to decide whether 
Congress intended to abrogate a tribe’s hunting and fishing rights.128 
	  
120 Id. at 87 (citing George Cameron Coggins & William Modrcin, Native American 
Indians and Federal Wildlife Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 375, 385–86 (1979)). 
121 See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); Menominee Tribe of Indians 
v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658 (D. 
Minn. 1991); United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
122 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[1], at 1190. 
123 Dion, 476 U.S. at 739. 
124 Scott C. Hall, The Indian Law Canons of Construction v. The Chevron Doctrine: 
Congressional Intent and the Unambiguous Answer to the Ambiguous Problem, 37 CONN. 
L. REV. 495, at 519 (2005). 
125 Id. 
126 See Dion, 476 U.S. at 739; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[1], at 
1190-91; Jami K. Elison, Tribal Sovereignty and the Endangered Species Act, 6 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 131, 137 (1998). 
127 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[3], at 1194-95; Elison, supra note 
126, at 137. 
128 See Dion, 476 U.S. at 739; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[1], at 
1190–91. 
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A. Standards for Abrogating Aboriginal Rights 
Courts have developed three standards for abrogating hunting and 
fishing rights based on aboriginal title. In some cases, the Supreme 
Court determined that aboriginal title is only extinguishable by “plain 
and unambiguous” congressional intent.129 However, in other cases, 
the Supreme Court held that aboriginal title could be extinguished at 
will and by any means available to the government.130 The Vermont 
Supreme Court took yet another approach. In State of Vermont v. 
Elliott,131 the court found that the Abenaki Tribe’s hunting and 
fishing rights, based on aboriginal title, were extinguished by the 
events surrounding Vermont’s admission to statehood.132 
B. Standards for Abrogating Treaty Rights 
For abrogation of Native American hunting and fishing rights 
based on treaties, the Supreme Court requires some finding of specific 
intent to abrogate these rights.133 In some cases, the Supreme Court 
requires “explicit statutory language.”134 In other cases, the Court 
does not require explicit statutory language as long as Congress’s 
intent is “clear and plain.”135 The Supreme Court also developed the 	  
129 See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247–48 (1985) 
(quoting United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 
346, 354 (1941) (noting that congressional intent to extinguish original title must be “plain 
and unambiguous,” and “will not be ‘lightly implied’”)). 
130 U.S. ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941) 
(noting that the power of Congress to abrogate aboriginal title is supreme and the manner 
and methods abrogation raises nonjusticiable political questions and “whether it be done 
by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to the 
right of [native] occupancy, or otherwise, its justness is not open to inquiry in the courts”); 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 585 (1823). 
131 State of Vermont v. Elliott, 616 A.2d 210 (Vt. 1992). 
132 The court found that the tribe’s aboriginal title was abrogated by “the increasing 
weight of history.” Id. at 218; see also Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 72, § 18.01, at 
1155. Many scholars have criticized this ruling. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 
18.01, at 1155 n.11. 
133 See infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. 
134 Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 
658, 690 (1979) (“Absent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to 
find congressional abrogation of treaty rights . . . .”); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (“We find it difficult to believe that Congress, 
without explicit statement, would subject the United States to a claim for compensation by 
destroying property rights conferred by treaty . . . .”). 
135 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 203 (1999) (quoting Dion, 476 U.S. at 739–40). 
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consideration-and-choice doctrine,136 which establishes that treaty 
rights are only abrogated if there is “clear evidence that Congress 
actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one 
hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that 
conflict by abrogating the treaty.”137 The consideration-and-choice 
doctrine is thought to be the “‘essential’ factor” in determining 
congressional intent.138 
Nonetheless, applying the consideration-and-choice doctrine has 
led district courts to inconsistent results. For example, in United 
States v. Billie,139 the district court determined that the Endangered 
Species Act abrogated the Seminole Tribe’s treaty right to hunt.140 
“The court held that the statute’s ‘general comprehensiveness, its non-
exclusion of Indians, and the limited exceptions for certain Alaskan 
Natives’ constituted ‘clear evidence’ that Congress had considered the 
conflict between the statute and reserved treaty rights,” and had 
chosen to abrogate it.141 
However, the district court in United States v. Bresette142 found 
that the exception for Alaskan Natives in the Migratory Bird Treaty 
Act did not provide “clear evidence” that Congress had considered the 
conflict between the statute and the treaty right or that Congress chose 
to abrogate it.143 Accordingly, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act did not 
abrogate the tribe’s reserved right to hunt and fish.144 
The Ninth Circuit confused the jurisprudence even further in 
Anderson v. Evans145  by rejecting the consideration-and-choice 
standard, created by the Supreme Court in United States v. Dion,146 
and creating a new three-part test. According to the Ninth Circuit, to 
decide whether a federal conservation statute affects a tribe’s treaty 
right to hunt and fish, the United States must first have jurisdiction 
	  
136 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[1], at 1191; see also Dion, 476 
U.S. at 739–40. 
137 Dion, 476 U.S. at 40. 
138 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[1], at 1191. 
139 United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 
140 Id. at 1492. 
141 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[3], at 1194 (quoting Billie, 667 F. 
Supp. at 1490). 
142 United States v. Bresette, 761 F. Supp. 658 (D. Minn. 1991). 
143 Id. at 663–64. 
144 Id. at 664. 
145 Anderson v. Evans, 371 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2004). 
146 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
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over the area where the hunting and fishing takes place.147 Second, 
the federal conservation statute must be non-discriminatory.148 Third, 
abrogating treaty rights must be “necessary” to achieve the statute’s 
conservation purpose.149 By creating this test, the Ninth Circuit 
completely avoided determining congressional intent.150 And, the 
court restricted the tribe’s right to hunt,151 despite clear congressional 
intent that the statute not affect treaty rights.152 
“The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Anderson cannot be reconciled 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Dion.”153  In Anderson, the 
Ninth Circuit based its articulation of the three-part test on its earlier 
decision in United States v. Fryberg.154  The Ninth Circuit based its 
decision in Fryberg on various Supreme Court cases, all of which 
involved state conservation statutes.155 These Supreme Court cases 
all considered whether a state, lacking the treaty abrogation power of 
Congress, appropriately exercised its police power to regulate Indian 
and non-Indian hunting and fishing rights.156 Six years after the 
Fryberg decision, the Supreme Court in Dion developed and applied 
the consideration-and-choice doctrine, without once referring to 
Fryberg. 
In bypassing the question of congressional intent and only focusing 
on whether the statute was for conservation purposes, the Ninth 
Circuit concentrated on the wrong question and violated principles of 
stare decisis. The Supreme Court has firmly established that the 
defining question in abrogation cases is whether Congress intended to 
abrogate the tribe’s treaty rights.157 Although the Anderson decision 
	  
147 Anderson, 371 F.3d at 497. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[3], at 1196. 
151 Anderson, 371 F.3d at 499–500. 
152 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[1], at 1196 & n.59. 
153 Id. § 18.07[3], at 1196. 
154 Anderson, 371 F.3d at 497 (citing United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010, 1015 
(9th Cir. 1980)). 
155 Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); Dep’t of Game v. Puyallup Tribe 
(“Puyallup II”), 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392 
(1968) (“Puyallup I”). 
156 See supra note 155. 
157 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 18.07[1], at 1190. 
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has been widely criticized158 and at least one district court chose not 
to extend it,159 the decision still remains good law. 
The foregoing demonstrates that the canons of construction do little 
to guide judicial analysis or to protect Native American hunting and 
fishing rights.160 Courts have been inconsistent in discussing or 
applying the canons of construction because “the canons appear to be 
the means to an end, which is congressional intent.”161 For example, 
whenever the Supreme Court has declined to apply the canons of 
construction in favor of Native Americans, it has always “somehow” 
found congressional intent to diminish or abrogate Native Americans’ 
rights.162 Furthermore, in recent years, the Supreme Court has 
become much more active in finding “clear” congressional intent 
even when that intent is arguably very unclear.163 In other words, the 
Court has expanded its own discretion in determining congressional 
intent.164 
Although courts have often upheld and enforced Native 
Americans’ right to hunt and fish, lack of a coherent framework for 
determining congressional intent and inconsistent application of the 
canons of construction diminish Native American hunting and fishing 
rights. Increasing consistency and predictability in abrogation case 
decisions would better protect a right that is fundamental to Native 
American culture. 
	  
158 See, e.g., id. § 18.07[1], at 1196. 
159 See, e.g., United States v. Fiddler, No. 2:10-cr-00052-RLH-LRL, 2011 WL 
2149510, at *7 (D. Nev. Mar. 11, 2011). 
160 See Hall, supra note 124, at 542–43. 
161 Id. at 542. 
162 Id. at 496 (citing Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Chevron Doctrine in Federal Indian 
Law and the Agencies’ Duty to Interpret Legislation in Favor of Indians: Did the EPA 
Reconcile the Two in Interpreting the “Tribes as States” Section of the Clean Water Act?, 
11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 15, 25 (1998)). 
163 Id. If the intent is “clear” (meaning there is no ambiguity in the statute), then the 
cannons of construction do not apply. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 2.02[1], at 
115. 
164 Hall, supra note 124, at 496. 
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IV 
INTERNATIONAL LAW RECOGNIZES AND PROTECTS INTANGIBLE 
CULTURAL HERITAGE 
Intangible cultural heritage, in a very general sense, refers to any 
cultural phenomenon that does not assume tangible form.165 It is 
culture that people practice as part of their daily lives.166 “It is often 
described as the underlying ‘spirit’ of a cultural group.”167 Intangible 
cultural heritage is challenging to define, analyze, and protect under 
many countries’ existing legal systems.168 Therefore, despite the 
importance of intangible cultural heritage, it is often unprotected and 
vulnerable to appropriation or extinction.169 
Yet, within the past two or three decades, the international 
community has begun to recognize the importance and vulnerability 
of intangible cultural heritage and has taken steps to define and 
protect it.170 Native American hunting and fishing rights are 
intangible cultural heritage under existing international declarations 
and treaties and, therefore, should be protected accordingly. 
A. Native American Hunting and Fishing Rights Are Intangible 
Cultural Heritage by Definition 
One of the primary reasons rights, like hunting and fishing, lack 
protection is because many legal systems have strict distinctions 
between protecting the intangible and tangible. For example, the 
United States protects the intangible primarily through intellectual 
property law, while property law protects the tangible. However, 
intellectual property law is not structured to protect cultural heritage 
like hunting and fishing rights.171 And property law often focuses 
narrowly on individual ownership, which fails to sufficiently account 	  
165 See JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER ET AL., CULTURAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL, 
COMPARATIVE, AND INDIGENOUS 614 (2010). 
166 Richard Kurin, Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage in the 2003 UNESCO 
Convention: A Critical Appraisal, 56 MUSEUM INT’L 66, 67 (2004). 
167 Id. 
168 See NAFZIGER, supra note 165, at 614–15. 
169 Id. at 615. 
170 Id. at 614. 
171 For a discussion about the inadequacy of intellectual property law to protect 
intangible cultural heritage, see Erin K. Slattery, Preserving the United States’ Intangible 
Cultural Heritage: An Evaluation of the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding 
of the Intangible Cultural Heritage as a Means to Overcome the Problems Posed by 
Intellectual Property Law, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 201 (2006). 
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for the cultural importance of Native Americans’ communal hunting 
and fishing rights.172 Defining Native American hunting and fishing 
rights as intangible cultural heritage would help resolve these 
problems and be an important step in recognizing and protecting these 
fundamental rights. 
The UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage (“the Convention”) defines intangible cultural 
heritage as: 
The practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—as 
well as the instruments, objects, artefacts [sic] and cultural spaces 
associated therewith—that communities, groups and, in some cases 
individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This 
intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to 
generation, is constantly recreated by communities and groups in 
response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their 
history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, 
thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity. 
For the purpose of this convention, consideration will be given 
solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with 
existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the 
requirements of mutual respect among communities, groups and 
individuals, and of sustainable development.173 
The Convention also lists examples of intangible cultural property, 
which include “social practices, rituals and festive events” and 
“knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe.”174 
Several arguments support the idea that Native American hunting 
and fishing rights should be defined as intangible cultural heritage 
under the Convention’s definition.175 First, the Convention’s 
definition recognizes that the intangible and tangible often overlap.176 
For example, the right to hunt and fish is intangible. However, this 
right is fundamentally dependent on various tangible things—the fish 	  
172 For a discussion of the shortcomings of traditional property law to protect 
indigenous cultural heritage, see Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, 
In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009). 
173 UNESCO Convention, supra note 6, at art. 2, § 1. 
174 Id. at art. 2, § 2(c)–(d). 
175 See Lyndel V. Prott, Hunting as Intangible Heritage: Some Notes on Its 
Manifestations, 14 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 385, 394 (2007) (“By any test, hunting falls 
within the ambit set out in the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage 2003. Indeed, the description is so broad as to include all the practices and skills 
of hunting anywhere in the world.”). 
176 UNESCO Convention, supra note 6, at art. 2, § 1. (“[T]he practices, representations, 
expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts [sic] and 
cultural spaces associated therewith—that communities . . . recognize as part of their 
cultural heritage.”). 
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and wildlife, the land and water where the fish and wildlife reside, 
boats, nets, guns, and other physical items required for hunting and 
fishing. Therefore, defining the right to hunt and fish as intangible 
cultural heritage more accurately reflects the holistic nature of the 
right, more so than defining the right solely as a tangible property 
right. 
Second, the Convention’s definition of intangible cultural heritage 
is subjective.177 Meaning, if a Native American tribe recognizes 
hunting or fishing as part of its cultural heritage, then hunting and 
fishing rights are considered intangible cultural heritage. As discussed 
in Part I, many tribes recognize hunting and fishing as an integral part 
of their culture, traditions, and history. 
Third, under the Convention, Native American hunting and fishing 
practices are “social practices, rituals and festive events,” and 
“knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe.”178 
Many tribes view hunting and fishing as a way for the community to 
reconnect and be brought together.179 Many Native American tribes 
have festive events that focus on hunting and fishing.180 For example, 
Puget Sound tribes practice First Salmon Ceremonies.181 In addition, 
many tribes still practice hunting and fishing rituals, such as the 
Inupiat who maintain elaborate rituals surrounding whale hunting.182 
Native American hunting practices also concern nature and the 
universe,183 and require knowledge that is often passed down from 
generation to generation.184 
Although its definition of cultural heritage is subjective,185 
UNESCO has already recognized some hunting and fishing rights and 	  
177 Id. at art. 2, § 1 (defining intangible cultural heritage as “the practices, 
representations, expressions, knowledge . . . that communities, groups and, in some cases, 
individuals recognize as part of their cultural heritage”). 
178 Id. at art. 2, § 2(c)–(d). 
179 See sources about whaling and salmon fishing, supra notes 63–64, 67–68. 
180 See Sepez, supra note 60. 
181 Barber, supra note 27; GAWLIK, supra note 27. For a discussion of First Salmon 
Ceremony, see supra notes 27–29. 
182 Bakalar, supra note 61. For an explanation of Inupiat whale hunting, see supra notes 
61–64. 
183 For a discussion of the Native American worldview, see supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
184 See Deanna Kingston, Walrus Hunting in a Changing Arctic, in TO HARVEST, TO 
HUNT: STORIES OF RESOURCE USE IN THE AMERICAN WEST 15, 17 (Judith L. Li ed., 
2007); see also GAWLIK, supra note 27, app. A at 28. 
185 UNESCO Convention, supra note 6, at art. 2, § 1. 
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rituals as intangible cultural heritage. In accordance with the 
Convention,186 UNESCO created a “List of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding.”187 The UNESCO 
Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage (“the Committee”) manages the list.188 The 
Committee continually updates the criteria for inclusion on the Urgent 
Safeguard List.189 However, the first element that must be met for a 
right to be included on the list is that “[t]he element constitutes 
intangible cultural heritage as defined in Article 2 [quoted above] of 
the Convention.”190 In 2009, the Committee included “the collective 
fishing rite of the Sanké” on the list.191 This collective fishing rite 
incorporates many elements of social cohesion, ceremony, tradition, 
and ritual that are also present in Native American fishing practices, 
like the First Salmon Ceremony.192 Additionally, in 2011, the 
Committee added “the Enawene Nawe people’s ritual for the 
maintenance of social and cosmic order” to the list.193 This ritual is 
	  
186 Id. at art. 17, § 1 (“With a view to taking appropriate safeguarding measures, the 
Committee shall establish, keep up to date and publish a List of Intangible Cultural 
Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding, and shall inscribe such heritage on the List at 
the request of the State Party concerned.”). 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at art. 7. See also Functions of the Intergovernmental Committee for the 
Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, UNESCO.ORG (Dec. 8, 2013), 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00586. 
189 Id. at art. 17. 
190 Criteria and Timetable of Inscription on the Representative List of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage of Humanity, UNESCO.ORG (Dec. 2012), http://www.unesco.org 
/culture/ich/index.php?pg=00173&lg=en#criteria-for-inscription-on-the-representative-list. 
191 Sanké Mon, Collective Fishing Rite of the Sanké, UNESCO.ORG (2009), 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00011&USL=00289. 
The Sanké mon collective fishing rite takes place in . . . Mali every second 
Thursday of the seventh lunar month . . . . The collective fishing . . . takes place 
over fifteen hours using large and small mesh fishing nets. It is immediately 
followed by a masked dance on the public square . . . [where dancers] wear 
traditional costumes . . . and perform specific choreography to the rhythms of a 
variety of drums. Traditionally, the Sanké mon rite marks the beginning of the 
rainy season. It is also is [sic] an expression of local culture through arts and 
crafts, knowledge and know-how in the fields of fisheries and water resources. It 
reinforces collective values of social cohesion, solidarity and peace between local 
communities. 
Id. 
192 See discussion supra notes 27–29. 
193 Yaokwa, the Enawene Nawe People’s Ritual for the Maintenance of Social and 
Cosmic Order, UNESCO.ORG (2011), http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg 
=en&pg=00011&USL=00521. 
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incorporated into the daily life of Native Amazonians and involves 
fishing and ritual fish offerings.194 The “collective fishing rite of the 
Sanké” and the “Enawene Nawe people’s ritual” are similar to many 
Native American hunting and fishing rites, rituals, and practices. 
UNESCO’s recognition of these two specific practices as intangible 
cultural heritage suggests that Native American hunting and fishing 
rites, rituals, and practices also constitute intangible cultural heritage. 
B. International Protection for Intangible Cultural Heritage 
The UNESCO General Conference adopted the Convention for the 
Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage on October 17, 2003.195 
The Convention entered into force on April 20, 2006, after thirty 
UNESCO member states ratified it.196 The purpose of the Convention 
is to ensure respect and mutual appreciation of intangible cultural 
heritage; raise awareness at the local, national, and international level 
of the importance of intangible cultural property; and safeguard 
intangible cultural property.197 The Convention also commits a 	  
The Enawene Nawe people live in . . . the southern Amazon rainforest. They 
perform the Yaokwa ritual every year during the drought period to honour the 
Yakairiti spirits, thereby ensuring cosmic and social order for the different clans. 
The ritual links local biodiversity to a complex, symbolic cosmology that 
connects the different but inseparable domains of society, culture and nature. It is 
integrated into their everyday activities over the course of seven months during 
which the clans alternate responsibilities: one group embarks on fishing 
expeditions throughout the area while another prepares offerings of rock salt, fish 
and ritual food for the spirits, and performs music and dance. The ritual combines 
knowledge of agriculture, food processing, handicrafts (costumes, tools and 
musical instruments) and the construction of houses and fishing dams. 
Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Text of the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, 
UNESCO.ORG (Oct. 17, 2003), http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg 
=00022. 
196 Intangible Heritage, Tenth Anniversary 2003-2013, http://www.unesco.org/culture 
/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00482 (last visited Jan. 6, 2014). For the purpose of this 
Comment, the term “ratify” is meant to encompass ratification, acceptance, and approval. 
Substantively, there is no difference among these terms; their use differs because the 
constitutional procedures of different nations use different terms to describe the process of 
ratification. 
197 UNESCO Convention, supra note 6, at art. 1. Article 1 provides: 
The purposes of this Convention are: 
(a) to safeguard the intangible cultural heritage; 
(b) to ensure respect for the intangible cultural heritage of the communities, 
groups and individuals concerned; 
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ratifying nation to “take the necessary measures to ensure the 
safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage” within its borders.198 
More specifically, the Convention requires a ratifying nation to create 
inventories of its intangible cultural heritage199 and promote 
awareness and education about this heritage.200 In 2003, 120 
UNESCO member states voted to adopt the Convention, and no 
member state voted against adoption.201  
Every year, since it was adopted in 2003, more nations ratify the 
Convention.202 The figure203 below depicts the Convention’s rising 
support: 
 
 
Although the United States has not ratified the Convention, as of 
July 27, 2013, 155 states have ratified it.204  
	  
(c) to raise awareness at the local, national and international levels of the 
importance of the intangible cultural heritage, and of ensuring mutual 
appreciation thereof; 
(d) to provide for international cooperation and assistance. 
Id. 
198 Id. at art. 11(a). 
199 Id. at art. 12, § 1. 
200 See id. at art. 14. 
201 Kurin, supra note 166, at 66. A few member states abstained from the vote 
including Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the United States. Id. 
202 See Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 
UNESCO.ORG (Oct. 17, 2003), http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=17116 
&language=E&order=alpha. 
203 The data used to create this figure can be found at Convention for the Safeguarding 
of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, UNESCO.ORG (Oct. 17, 2003), http://www.unesco 
.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=17116&language=E. 
204 See id. 
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The UNESCO Convention represents a commitment to 
acknowledge and protect a culture at its own level, rather than by a 
state.205  For example, safeguarding by states must be done with the 
authorization, cooperation, and substantive decision-making 
involvement of the relevant community.206 Richard Kurin helped 
draft the Convention207 and explains its importance: 
[The Convention] reinforces the idea that the practice of one’s 
culture is a human right. It seeks government recognition and 
respect for the varied cultural traditions practised [sic] by people 
within its jurisdiction. It seeks to bolster the idea that all cultures 
give purpose and meaning to lives and thus deserve to be 
safeguarded. . . . It suggests that forms of safeguarding be integrated 
with legal, educational, and economic development efforts where 
appropriate so that culture retains its vitality and dynamism.208 
In addition to the UNESCO Convention, the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“the Declaration”) 
also protects intangible cultural heritage like hunting and fishing 
rights. The Declaration is the most comprehensive international 
assertion of indigenous rights.209 The Declaration recognizes 
collective rights—rights that belong to a group rather than an 
individual.210 While the Declaration does not use the phrase 
“intangible cultural heritage,” it definitely establishes indigenous 
peoples’ rights to such heritage. For instance, indigenous peoples 
have the right to: 
• “[P]ractise [sic] and revitalize their cultural traditions and 
customs[,] . . . [which] includes the right to maintain, protect, 
and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their 
cultures”;211 	  
205 NAFZIGER, supra note 165, at 628. 
206 See Kurin, supra note 166, at 71; see also UNESCO Convention, supra note 6, at 
art. 11(b). 
207 Kurin, supra note 166, at 66. 
208 Id. at 75. 
209 Rosemary J. Coombe, First Nations Intangible Cultural Heritage Concerns: 
Prospects for Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions 
in International Law, in PROTECTION OF FIRST NATIONS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LAWS, 
POLICY, AND REFORM 247, 247 (Catherine Bell & Robert K. Paterson eds., 2009). 
210 U.N. Declaration, supra note 5. This is significant because many rights are viewed 
as held by an individual rather than a group, which makes it particularly hard for Native 
Americans to enforce their collective rights. See Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, supra note 
172; Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A 
Historic Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 539, 547 (2009). 
211 U.N. Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 11, § 1. 
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• “[M]anifest, practise, [sic] develop and teach their spiritual 
traditions, customs and ceremonies”;212 
• “[B]e secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence 
and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and 
other economic activities”;213 
• “[M]aintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship 
with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used 
lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other 
resources”;214 and 
• “[U]se . . . the lands, territories and resources that they possess 
by reason of traditional ownership or other traditional 
occupation or use.”215 
Robert Coulter, a recognized authority on the Declaration,216 
interprets these rights to include indigenous peoples’ right to hunt and 
fish.217 
In addition to establishing indigenous peoples’ rights to intangible 
cultural heritage, the Declaration also asserts that states owe certain 
legal duties to indigenous peoples. First, states must honor and respect 
treaties and agreements between indigenous peoples and the state by 
recognizing and enforcing the treaties and agreements.218 Second, 
states “shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous 
peoples concerned, a fair, independent . . . and transparent process, 
giving due recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, [and] 
customs . . . to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous 
peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, including 
those that were traditionally owned.”219 
	  
212 Id. at art. 12, § 1. 
213 Id. at art. 20, § 1. 
214 Id. at art. 25. 
215 Id. at art. 26, § 2. 
216 Robert Coulter is a practicing attorney admitted to the bar in three states: Montana, 
New York, and the District of Columbia. Coulter, supra note 210, at 539 n.*. He graduated 
from Columbia University School of Law in 1969. Id. He is also a member of the Citizen 
Potawatomi Nation and is Executive Director of the Indian Law Resource Center. Id. 
Coulter has participated in the development of the draft U.N. Declaration since 1976. Id. 
217 Coulter, supra note 210, at 551 & n.80 (interpreting articles twenty and twenty-five 
of the U.N. Declaration as establishing a right to hunt and fish). 
218 See U.N. Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 37, § 1 (“Indigenous peoples have the 
right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States 
honour [sic] and respect such treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements.”). 
219 Id. at art. 27. 
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The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on 
September 13, 2007.220 In total, 143 member states voted in favor of 
adopting the Declaration, while four voted against adoption.221 The 
member states that voted against adoption were the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.222 Since 2007, Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand changed their position on the 
Declaration,223 and in 2010, President Obama announced the United 
States’ support for the Declaration.224 
Many legal systems, including the United States’, have difficulty 
defining, analyzing, and protecting intangible cultural heritage within 
their established legal principles and rules,225 which can lead to 
inconsistent or inadequate protection for intangible cultural heritage at 
the national, local, and regional level. However, the Convention and 
the Declaration can help the United States develop a more consistent 
application of existing law to intangible cultural heritage. A more 
uniform application of law would result in stronger, more consistent 
protection for intangible cultural heritage, including Native American 
hunting and fishing rights. 
V 
NON-BINDING INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE 
IN DEVELOPING UNITED STATES INDIAN LAW AND POLICY 
Even when an international law is not directly enforceable in 
international forums or United States courts, the laws may still 
significantly impact Federal Indian law in three ways.226 First, non-
binding international law contributes to the development of customary 
international law.227 Customary international law originates from 	  
220 U.N. Declaration, supra note 5. 
221 Coulter, supra note 210, at 545. 
222 Id. 
223 Valerie Richardson, Obama Adopts U.N. Manifesto on Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec 
/16/obama-adopts-un-manifesto-on-rights-of-indigenous-/?page=all. 
224 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR GLOBAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Announcement of U.S. Support for the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Initiatives to Promote the 
Government-to-Government Relationship & Improve the Lives of Indigenous Peoples 1 
(2011) [hereinafter Announcement], available at http://www.state.gov/documents 
/organization/154782.pdf. 
225 NAFZIGER, supra note 165, at 615. 
226 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 5.07[5], at 484. 
227 Id. § 18.07[1], at 485. 
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international customs and norms not necessarily contained in any 
formal document.228 Customary international law is usually 
determined by considering the practices of a community of nations.229 
However, not every common practice is customary international 
law—only those common practices that nations consider themselves 
legally obligated to follow.230 Although it is sometimes difficult to 
determine the line between customary international law and “mere 
usage,”231 customary international law is part of federal common law 
in the United States.232 Courts should interpret acts of Congress in a 
way that does not conflict with customary international law whenever 
possible.233 
Second, international law can serve as an “interpretive guide” in 
constitutional construction cases, and it can help shape policy by 
influencing legislation.234 Early Supreme Court cases that established 
fundamental principles of Federal Indian law “extensively” relied on 
international law.235 For example, the existence and scope of Native 
American title to property through aboriginal title, inherent tribal 
sovereignty, and the relationship between tribes and the federal 
government originated from the Supreme Court’s interpretation and 
adaptation of international law.236 Although heavy reliance on 
international law faded by the twentieth century, evidence suggests 
that international law is again becoming a powerful tool to shape 
federal Indian law and policy.237 For example: 
[I]nternational organizations . . . have increasingly turned their 
attention to issues affecting indigenous peoples worldwide. This 
increased attention is just beginning to result in concrete legal tools 
that can be used to shape federal Indian law. Nevertheless, there are 
clear patterns of consensus emerging with respect to universal 
international norms that may affect the course of Indian law 
development in the United States.238 	  
228 Id. 
229 Id. § 18.07[1], at 453. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. § 5.07[1], at 453. Mere usage is a law that a nation follows “as a matter of 
courtesy,” while customary international law are rules that a nation believes it is 
“obligated” to follow. Id. 
232 See id. § 5.07[4][a][ii], at 482. 
233 See id. 
234 Id. § 5.07[5], at 484. 
235 Id. § 5.07[1], at 451. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. § 5.07[1], at 451–52. 
238 Id. § 5.07[1], at 452. 
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Third, examining the development of indigenous peoples’ rights in 
international law “provides a basis for more fully understanding the 
factors that contribute to the development of our own federal Indian 
law, thereby facilitating positive changes to the law.”239 
Both the United Nations Declaration and the UNESCO Convention 
are non-binding in the United States. While the Convention is binding 
on nations that ratify it, the United States has yet to ratify. 
Accordingly, the Convention remains non-binding in the United 
States.240 While the United States supports the United Nations 
Declaration, the Declaration is non-binding by nature.241 Declarations 
are generally considered aspirational statements that are not legally 
binding or directly enforceable in the United States.242  
Regardless of their enforceability, the United Nations Declaration 
and the UNESCO Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage can 
positively impact the current development of Native American law 
and policy. The UNESCO Convention will likely be less significant 
in developing United States Indian law than the United Nations 
Declaration because the United States has taken no position on the 
Convention—neither supporting nor opposing it.243 
A. The Convention’s Impact on Federal Indian Law and Policy 
In recent years, intangible cultural heritage has attracted growing 
attention among intellectuals and political stakeholders.244 It is also 
gaining recognition in Western countries, like the United States, 
because of the increasing concern for the preservation of living 
cultures as an avenue for promoting cultural diversity.245 	  
239 Id. § 5.07[5], at 485. 
240 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
241 See supra note 224; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 5.07[1], at 452. 
242 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 5.07[1], at 452. 
243 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. The United States has had a rocky 
relationship with UNESCO. Slattery, supra note 171, at 210. Although the United States 
was a founding member of UNESCO, it withdrew from UNESCO in 1984. Id. However, 
in 2002 the Bush administration announced that the United States would renew its 
commitment to the UNESCO organization. Id. The Bush administration specifically stated, 
“[a]s a symbol of our commitment to human dignity, the United States will return to 
UNESCO. This organization has been reformed and America will participate fully in its 
mission to advance human rights, tolerance, and learning.” Id. 
244 Hugh C. Hansen, Michael Blakeney, Linda S. Lourie, Paul E. Salmon & Coenraad 
Visser, Panel II: The Law and Policy of Protecting Folklore, Traditional Knowledge, and 
Genetic Resources, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 753, 780 (2002). 
245 Id. 
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Accordingly, the United States and many other countries are adopting 
intangible cultural heritage policies.246 These policies are creating 
lively discussions and debates at the national and international level 
about intangible cultural heritage.247  The UNESCO Convention is an 
important part of this ongoing discussion and debate about intangible 
cultural heritage. Furthermore, the Convention has widespread 
support in the international community, and it continues to gain the 
support of more nations every year since its adoption in 2003.248 For 
all these reasons, the United States should not ignore the UNESCO 
Convention. 
B. The Declaration’s Impact on Federal Indian Law and Policy 
The United Nations Declaration will have a significant impact on 
United States law and policy.249 First, the Declaration plays a key role 
in establishing international norms.250 “[I]t evidence[s] international 
law’s increasing recognition of the shortcomings of legal systems that 
define property rights solely in terms of land.”251 In addition, the 
Declaration is consistent with this broader view of property, and 
expands “the scope of protection beyond the traditional rights of 
ownership and possession.”252 As explained above, these 
international legal norms can influence the outcome of litigation and 	  
246 WEATHERHEAD CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, 
Annual Reports 2004–2005, 2005–2006 30–31 (2006), available at http://dev.wcfia 
.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/WCFIAAR04_06.pdf. For example, in 1965 Congress 
created the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities. National Foundation on the 
Arts and Humanities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 951 (1965). The Act authorizes government 
financial support for the arts and humanities, and recognizes the importance of the arts and 
humanities to education and national cultural identity. Id. Additionally, in 1976, Congress 
created the American Folklife Center to “preserve and present American folk life.” Hansen 
et al., supra note 244, at 780 (quoting About the American Folklife Center, THE LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.loc.gov/folklife/aboutafc.html). 
 The Center and its collections of folklife are continually growing, and the Center 
remains one of the oldest and largest folklife repositories in the world. Id. (citing About the 
American Folklife Center, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www 
.loc.gov/folklife/aboutafc.html). 
247 Hansen et al., supra note 244, at 780 (citing About the American Folklife Center, 
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.loc.gov/folklife/aboutafc.html). 
248 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 
UNESCO.ORG (Oct. 17, 2003), http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?language 
=E&KO=17116. 
249 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 72, § 5.07[3][a], at 468–70. 
250 See id. 
251 Id. § 5.07[3][c], at 477. 
252 Id. 
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the creation of new policy.253 Second, international legal norms have 
the potential to become binding international customary law.254 After 
the United States adopted the Declaration, it became a United Nations 
“consensus document”255—a document that represents an 
international consensus on the minimum legal rights of indigenous 
peoples and minimum legal duties states owe indigenous peoples.256 
If nations abide by the terms of this Declaration and believe they are 
obligated to do so, then the Declaration will become binding 
international customary law. 
Coulter, one of the premiere experts on the Declaration,257 
confirms that the Declaration “expresses norms of customary 
international law binding on states by virtue of their observance of 
these norms as a matter of practice and the belief that such practice is 
required.”258  It may be too soon to tell if nations will abide by the 
terms of the Declaration. However, it seems that all United Nations 
member states intend to abide by its terms because they supported the 
Declaration. In addition, because the Declaration represents an 
international consensus, nations may feel more obligated to abide by 
its terms. If this is true, the terms of the Declaration may be 
considered customary international law that binds United States 
courts. 
Even if the Declaration is not customary international law, the 
United States intends to abide by its terms. The United States changed 
its position to support the Declaration based on a “comprehensive” 
interagency policy review and “extensive” consultation with Native 
American tribes.259  The U.S. Department of State noted that the 
Declaration carries considerable “moral and political force.”260 
Furthermore, in 2010, when President Obama announced the United 
States’ support for the Declaration at the White House Tribal Nations 
Conference, he stated: 
The aspirations [the Declaration] affirms—including the respect for 
the institutions and rich cultures of Native Peoples—are one[s] we 	  
253 Id. § 5.07[4][a][i], at 479–80. 
254 See id. § 5.07[2][a], at 453. 
255 Richardson, supra note 223. 
256 See Coulter, supra note 210, at 546. 
257 See supra note 216. 
258 ROBERT T. COULTER, NATIVE LAND LAW § 6:12 (2012 ed.). 
259 Announcement, supra note 224, at 2, 3. 
260 Id. at 1. 
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must always seek to fulfill. . . . But I want to be clear: What matters 
far more than words—what matters far more than any resolution or 
declaration—are actions to match those words. . . . That’s what this 
conference is about. That’s the standard I expect my administration 
to be held to.261 
This statement strongly suggests that the government intends to honor 
the Declaration in practice—through “actions,” not merely formal 
support. 
Furthermore, in a detailed statement about the United States’ 
support for the Declaration,262 the government discussed the 
Declaration’s effect on Native American law and policy.263 This 
statement explains that the Declaration expresses aspirations “that this 
country seeks to achieve within the structure of the U.S. Constitution, 
laws, and international obligations, while also seeking, where 
appropriate, to improve our laws and policies.”264 In addition, “[t]he 
United States aspires to improve relations with indigenous peoples by 
looking to the principles embodied in the Declaration in its dealings 
with federally recognized tribes.”265 This statement specifically 
discusses the implications of the Declaration for Native Americans’ 
	  
261 Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at the 
White House Tribal Nations Conference (Dec. 16, 2010, 9:39 A.M. EST), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/16/remarks-president-white-house    
-tribal-nations-conference. 
262 Announcement, supra note 224. 
263 See id. 
264 Id. at 1. 
265 Id. at 2. While this statement is encouraging to federally recognized Indian tribes, it 
also suggests that the government has no intention of following the principles of the 
Declaration in its dealing with federally unrecognized tribes. The process tribes must go 
through to acquire federal recognition has been widely and severely criticized. PEVAR, 
supra note 3, at 273. A tribe must show that it exercised continuous governmental control 
over its members, which seems unjust given that the U.S. government has a history of 
disrupting, displacing, and assimilating many tribes. Id. at 272. Tribes must also meet a 
steep burden of proof that requires producing documentation of meetings held up to a 
century ago. Id. at 272–73. Since many tribes traditionally focused on oral history, those 
tribes likely cannot produce such documentation. Id. at 273. The process is also lengthy 
and expensive. Id. Tribes sometimes wait up to ten years for a decision regarding their 
recognition and spend millions of dollars on the process. Id. Accordingly, many tribes that 
are well known to the federal government and that may even have a reservation and 
treaties with the government do not meet the standard for federal recognition. See id. at 
273–74. Especially given the unreasonable recognition process, the government should 
“aspire[] to improve relations with indigenous peoples by looking to the principles 
embodied in the Declaration in its dealings with” all its indigenous peoples, not just 
“federally recognized tribes.” Announcement, supra note 224, at 2. 
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right to land, natural resources, and culture.266  In regard to Native 
American land and natural resources, the statement explains: 
The United States recognizes that some of the most grievous acts 
committed by the United States . . . against indigenous peoples were 
with regard to their lands, territories, and natural resources. For this 
reason, . . . the United States stresses the importance of the lands, 
territories, [and] resource[] . . . provisions of the Declaration in 
calling on all States to recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to 
their lands, territories, and natural resources. . . . [T]he United 
States understands these provisions to call for the existence of 
national laws and mechanisms for the full legal recognition of the 
lands, territories, and natural resources indigenous peoples currently 
possess by reason of traditional ownership, [or] occupation . . . . 
[T]he United States intends to continue to work so that the laws and 
mechanisms it has put in place to recognize existing, and 
accommodate the acquisition of additional, land, territory, and 
natural resource rights under U.S. law function properly and to 
facilitate . . . access by indigenous peoples to the traditional lands, 
territories and natural resources in which they have an interest.267 
The statement is less specific about Native American culture. It 
declares only that “[t]he many facets of Native American cultures—
including their religions [and] traditions . . . —need to be protected, as 
reflected in multiple provisions of the Declaration.”268 Therefore, the 
United States intends to abide by the terms of the Declaration, at least 
in respect to the parts of the Declaration that relate to intangible 
cultural heritage. Accordingly, the Declaration will have a positive 
impact on Native American law and policy in the United States.  
VI 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CAN RESOLVE CONFLICTS IN THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK THAT DIMINISH NATIVE AMERICAN HUNTING AND 
FISHING RIGHTS 
The UNESCO Convention and the United Nations Declaration can 
resolve inconsistencies in the current legal framework in three ways. 
First, defining Native Americans’ right to hunt and fish as intangible 
cultural heritage, under the Convention, accurately reflects the nature 
of these rights. Second, the Declaration could resolve inconsistencies 
and increase predictability in treaty abrogation cases involving Native 
American hunting and fishing rights. Third, the Convention and the 	  
266 See Announcement, supra note 224. 
267 Id. at 6. 
268 Id. at 13. 
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Declaration both suggest that courts should give at least some 
consideration to the cultural significance of hunting and fishing to 
Native American tribes. 
A. Defining Native American Hunting and Fishing Rights as 
Intangible Cultural Property 
Defining Native American hunting and fishing rights as intangible 
cultural heritage, as opposed to mere tangible property rights, more 
accurately reflects the nature of these rights. One reason the legal 
framework remains capricious is because it creates a dichotomy 
between protecting tangible and intangible objects, and because it 
focuses on individual ownership.269 Native American hunting and 
fishing rights do not fit this dichotomy. In the United States, 
intellectual property law protects certain forms of intangible property. 
However, the existing intellectual property regime in the United 
States only protects copyrights, patents, and trademarks.270 Native 
Americans’ right to hunt and fish does not fit within these legal 
concepts.271 Furthermore, many scholars have discussed the inability 
of intellectual property to protect intangible cultural heritage.272 
The United States employs a variety of property laws that protect 
tangible cultural heritage.273 While Native American hunting and 
fishing rights are generally protected under property law, property law 
is often narrowly focused on individual ownership. Property laws 
focusing on individual ownership can devalue both collective rights 
and the cultural importance of hunting and fishing.274 Tribal hunting 
and fishing inseparably combine the tangible and intangible. For 
example, hunting and fishing require the fish and game species, and 
the land they occupy. Yet, hunting and fishing also require knowledge 
of, and access to the land and species. 
Defining Native American hunting and fishing rights as intangible 
cultural heritage under the Convention could help resolve these 
problems. It would recognize that hunting and fishing rights are 
fundamentally important to Native American culture and that 	  
269 See Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, supra note 172, at 1027–29. 
270 See id. at 1041, 1065 (noting as an example that “most indigenous oral creations 
[are] considered to be in the public domain and [are] ineligible for protection under federal 
copyright law”). 
271 See generally NAFZIGER, supra note 165. 
272 Slattery, supra note 171. 
273 Id. at 214. 
274 See Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, supra note 172, at 1027–29. 
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protecting these rights requires protecting both intangible and tangible 
property. Furthermore, understanding and defining Native American 
hunting and fishing rights as intangible cultural property may lead to 
statutory and judicial common law that more adequately recognizes 
and protects the unique nature of intangible cultural heritage. 
B. Using the Declaration to Resolve Inconsistency and Predictability 
in Abrogation Cases 
In addition, the United Nations Declaration could resolve 
inconsistencies and increase predictability in abrogation cases 
involving Native American hunting and fishing rights. The 
declaration itself recognizes Native American rights to hunt and fish 
as a cultural and spiritual tradition and as an economic and 
subsistence activity.275 The Declaration also establishes that states 
should “honour and respect” treaties made with tribes by recognizing 
and enforcing these treaties.276 In addition, the Declaration stresses 
the importance of a fair, independent, and transparent process to 
recognize and adjudicate tribal rights like hunting and fishing.277 It 
also requires that this process “give[] due recognition” to Native 
American traditions and customs.278 
Currently, the process for adjudicating abrogation claims for 
Native American hunting and fishing rights is arguably not fair, 
transparent, or independent. As discussed in Part III, courts employ a 
variety of standards to determine if the tribes’ rights have been 
abrogated.279 Furthermore, the outcome often hangs on the subjective 
discretion of the court determining congressional intent.280 This 
inconsistent framework is not transparent or fair because it lacks 
consistency and predictability. Parties litigating an abrogation dispute 
are ultimately left to the whim of the particular court. In addition, 
these inconsistencies also indicate a lack of respect for Native 
American treaties. 
When the United States government supported the Declaration, it 
released a statement that stressed the importance of the Declaration’s 
provisions about Native Americans’ rights to land and natural 	  
275 See U.N. Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 12, 20. 
276 Id. at art. 37. 
277 Id. at art. 27. 
278 Id. 
279 See discussion supra Part III. 
280 See Hall, supra note 124, at 515–16. 
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resources.281 The government also stated that it intends to continue 
working on the laws and mechanisms that recognize and 
accommodate tribal rights to land and resources, so that they 
“function properly” and “facilitate . . . access” to lands and 
resources.282 As discussed above, the laws and mechanisms that 
recognize and accommodate Native Americans’ access to natural 
resources, like hunting and fishing, are not “functioning properly.” 
Therefore, the terms of the Declaration and the Department of 
State’s announcement about the Declaration’s effect both provide 
strong support for judicial or statutory action to address the 
inconsistencies in abrogation litigation. The inconsistencies and lack 
of predictability in abrogation litigation could be resolved largely by 
applying the existing framework in a more precise and consistent 
way. For example, Congress or the Supreme Court could settle on a 
single test to determine congressional intent and create additional 
rules for applying the test that would promote consistency and 
decrease judicial discretion.283 While determining congressional 
intent will usually require some judicial discretion, the Declaration 
urges development of a consistent and predictable framework for 
deciding abrogation cases. 
C. Weighing the Cultural Significance of Native American Hunting 
and Fishing Rights in Court 
Finally, the Convention and the Declaration suggest that courts 
should give at least some weight and consideration to the cultural 
significance of hunting and fishing to tribes. It is unclear how heavily 
courts currently weigh such arguments. Some courts consider and 
recognize these cultural arguments. For example, in United States v. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,284  the Ninth 
Circuit noted that the Wenatchi tribe’s fishing area formed “the hub 
around which the Wenatchi’s cycle of life rotated.”285 Similarly, in 	  
281 Announcement, supra note 224. 
282 Id. at 6. 
283 For example, to determine congressional intent based on the consideration-and-
choice doctrine, additional rules, such as the statute, must contain a statement that clearly 
shows that Congress considered the Native American right and chose to abrogate it. 
Congress could include a statement that says “this Act may conflict with Native American 
treaty rights in the following ways . . . To the extent that this Act interferes with Native 
American treaty rights, those rights should/should not be abrogated.” 
284 United States v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 606 F.3d 
698 (9th Cir. 2010). 
285 Id. at 701. 
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Kandra v. United States,286 the district court denied a request from 
non-Indians to reduce the Klamath and Yurok Tribes’ treaty-based 
fishing rights.287 It explained these tribes “rely on fish as a vital 
component of the Tribes’ cultures, traditions, and economic vitality,” 
and reducing the tribes’ access to fish would result “in a loss of food, 
income, employment opportunities, and sense of community.”288 
However, other decisions make little to no mention of the cultural 
significance of hunting and fishing to tribes. 
The Declaration recognizes Native Americans’ right to maintain, 
practice, and revitalize their cultural traditions.289 In addition, the 
Convention is a powerful testament to the growing awareness and 
support for safeguarding intangible cultural heritage. Together these 
documents suggest that courts should give at least some consideration 
and weight to Native Americans’ cultural arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the United States’ legal system has many shortcomings 
when it comes to protecting Native American intangible cultural 
heritage, tribes have made significant progress in enforcing their right 
to hunt and fish. In the past forty years, many tribes enjoyed 
important victories that solidified their hunting and fishing rights and, 
in some cases, allowed the tribe to renew traditional hunting and 
fishing practices.290 The concept of intangible cultural heritage is 
relatively new and protections for such heritage, at the national and 
international level, have only begun to take shape. The tribal victories 
in enforcing hunting and fishing rights, the United States’ recent 
support for the United Nations Declaration, and the ongoing 
development of national and international intangible cultural heritage 
discussions all suggest, however, that the United States is moving in 
the right direction. Nevertheless, much remains to be done to adapt 
Indian law and policy to fully account for the unique nature of 	  
286 Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001). 
287 Id. at 1201. 
288 Id. 
289 U.N. Declaration, supra note 5. 
290 See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 
443 U.S. 658 (1979); United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), modified in part, 653 F.2d 277 
(6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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intangible cultural heritage. The United States should continue to take 
steps to protect intangible cultural heritage like Native American 
hunting and fishing rights. Such steps should include signing and 
ratifying the UNESCO Convention, and reforming existing law and 
policy to be more consistent with the principles established in the 
Convention and the Declaration. 
 
 
